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When it comes to emotion, all roads lead to the autonomic nerv-
ous system (ANS). Whether it is the generation, expression, 
experience, or recognition of emotion, the role of the ANS is 
critical. In the six decades since Ax first applied modern 
laboratory-based psychophysiological methods to determine 
whether anger and fear produced different patterns of attendant 
ANS activity (Ax, 1953), the centrality of the ANS in emotion 
has inspired large bodies of research devoted to different aspects 
of the ANS–emotion relationship. Regrettably, despite many 
heroic attempts, these literatures are still characterized more by 
enduring controversies than by consensual views. Among the 
many controversies, two of the most long-lived and most 
passionately debated both concern the extent of patterning of 
the ANS in emotion. The first of these focuses on the degree 
of ANS coherence in emotion and the second on the degree of 
ANS specificity in emotion.
With coherence, the core issue is the extent to which the 
ANS response in emotion is organized and coordinated. 
Research in this domain has addressed two kinds of coherence: 
(a) coherence within the ANS (e.g., among cardiac, vascular, 
and electrodermal responses), and (b) coherence between the 
ANS and other emotion response systems (e.g., among cardio-
vascular responses, facial expressions, and subjective emotional 
experience). With specificity, the core issue is the extent to 
which ANS responses differ for particular emotions. With both, 
different theorists, empiricists, and literature amalgamators 
often reach quite disparate conclusions about the extent of pat-
terning.
In this article, I will be considering both coherence and spec-
ificity, sources of ANS patterning in emotion that have usually 
been considered separately. My intent is not to provide yet 
another review of the relevant literatures. A number of these 
reviews already exist, some selective and others more exhaus-
tive, some quite dispassionate and others more polemic, and 
none producing a sense of emerging consensus. Rather my 
premise is that the lack of consensus is highly symptomatic of 
underlying challenges in navigating between theories and 
empirical tests. Thus, I plan to revisit the theoretical underpin-
nings of coherence and specificity, discuss what studies would 
look like that would truly test and provide opportunities to dis-
confirm these ideas, and consider some of the significant meth-
odological obstacles that will need to be overcome if such 
research is going to be pursued. I believe that all serious 
researchers working in this area (regardless of their theoretical 
preconceptions) would benefit from thoughtful dialog about 
how these ideas can best be tested in the laboratory and in the 
field, how to improve the replicability of findings, and how to 
reach greater consensus as to whether there really is any pat-
terned ANS activity in emotion, and, if so, what kind and how 
much.
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Abstract
In many evolutionary/functionalist theories, emotions organize the activity of the autonomic nervous system (ANS) and 
other physiological systems. Two kinds of patterned activity are discussed: (a) coherence (i.e., emotions organize and 
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being are considered.
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Patterned ANS Activity: Possibility  
or Oxymoron?
Any discussion of the extent of patterned ANS activity in emo-
tion must address concerns that are often raised as to whether 
the ANS even has the capacity for differentiated action. Clearly, 
if the ANS is structurally or functionally incapable of multiple 
patterns of activation, then the search for patterned ANS activa-
tion in emotion is doomed. For this reason, it may be useful to 
review briefly some of the structural and functional features of 
the ANS that support patterned activation as well as those that 
work against it.
Structure
Is the ANS even capable of patterned activity? In one influential 
view, the ANS can produce only one pattern of activation, a pat-
tern best characterized as diffuse and undifferentiated arousal 
(Cannon, 1927). If correct, then the number of discernable ANS 
patterns is limited to two (i.e., not activated and diffusely acti-
vated). Cannon’s “all-or-none” view of ANS activation derived 
support from several structural features of the ANS. For exam-
ple, there are large ganglia located near the spinal chord where 
almost all of the fibers of the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) 
are routed after leaving the thoracic and lumbar segments of the 
spinal chord. In these ganglia, preganglionic SNS neurons con-
nect with the postganglionic neurons that travel to target organs 
(e.g., heart, lungs). Having so many SNS neurons in such close 
proximity is conducive to cross-talk and coactivation between 
sympathetic nerves. Diffuse action is also facilitated by norepi-
nephrine being the primary neurotransmitter for postganglionic 
SNS neurons when they synapse with their target organs. 
Because norepinephrine is released by the medulla of the adre-
nal glands during SNS activation, circulating norepinephrine 
can sustain and broaden ANS activation.
Cannon’s view of the ANS continues to be influential. It 
played an important role in several highly influential cognitive 
theories of emotion (Mandler, 1975; Schachter & Singer, 1962) 
and is often cited in arguments against ANS patterning in emo-
tion. There is no question that the state of diffuse SNS that 
Cannon described does exist. However, it is more accurate to 
view it as but one of a number of patterns of activation the ANS 
is capable of producing. Within the SNS, contemporary studies 
reveal a number of different types of receptors (e.g., alpha and 
beta receptors and their various subtypes), each of which has a 
different “tuning” (i.e., maximal sensitivity to different neuro-
transmitters) and a different “geography” (i.e., differential dis-
tribution throughout the SNS).
The other branch of the ANS, the parasympathetic nervous 
system (PNS), provides additional potential for differentiated 
action. The structure of the PNS is quite different from that of 
the SNS. In the PNS, preganglionic fibers exit from the brain-
stem and sacral segments of the spinal chord and synapse with 
postganglionic fibers close to the target organs without passing 
through common ganglia. Because neurotransmission (both 
presynaptic and postsynaptic) in the PNS is via acetylcholine, 
circulating norepinephrine released by the adrenal medulla does 
not cause diffuse PNS activation.
In thinking about the potential for multiple patterns of ANS 
activation, it is important to consider coactivation in target 
organs that are served by both SNS and PNS fibers (e.g., the 
sino-atrial node of the heart, pupils of the eyes). With these 
organs, the interplay of SNS and PNS action allows for addi-
tional patterns of activation. For example, heart rate is one of the 
most commonly used ANS measures in the specificity and 
coherence literatures. Heart rate at any given moment in time is 
a function of the action of three neural influences: (a) intrinsic 
pacemaker cells in the sino-atrial node (which would cause the 
heart to beat at approximately 100 beats per minute; Jose & 
Collison, 1970), (b) PNS fibers (which act to slow the rate), and 
(c) SNS fibers (which act to speed the rate). At rest, heart rate is 
under vagal restraint, slowed by PNS action (via the vagal 
nerve) to its typical resting rate of approximately 70 beats per 
minute. Thus, increases in heart rate during an emotional epi-
sode may reflect reduced PNS influence or increased SNS influ-
ence.
These and other structural features of the ANS certainly pro-
vide an adequate basis for patterned action in emotion. Of 
course, asserting that the ANS has the capacity for patterned 
action is still a long way from establishing coherence or speci-
ficity of ANS in emotion.
Function
Using descriptors such as “vegetative” and affording minimum 
coverage in many neuroscience, neurology, and physiology 
texts suggests that the ANS is but a simple, crude, and minor 
part of the nervous system. The reality, however, is quite differ-
ent. The ANS coordinates and manages a complex, highly dif-
ferentiated network of nerves, organs, and biological sensors 
that is distributed throughout the human body. Importantly, the 
ANS plays a critical role in determining the quality of our lives 
in both the short and long terms. In the short term, the ANS 
constantly monitors conditions and makes adjustments that ena-
ble us to deal with a host of internal and external demands. In 
the long term, the ANS assumes major responsibility for track-
ing and controlling a wide range of functions that determine our 
health, illness, vigor, and thriving, and that ultimately determine 
whether we survive or perish.
Functionally, the ANS plays a number of different roles, 
serving as regulator, activator, coordinator, and communicator. 
As regulator, the ANS is responsible for homeostasis, maintain-
ing our internal bodily milieu within strict limits so as to mini-
mize damage and maximize functioning. As activator, the ANS 
facilitates short-term deviations away from homeostasis that 
allocate bodily resources in ways that enable us to deal effec-
tively with significant challenges and opportunities. As coordi-
nator, the ANS manages a rich, continuous bidirectional flow of 
data that makes critical information about bodily states and 
activities available to both evolutionarily ancient and newer 
brain structures. As communicator, the ANS produces visible 
appearance changes that have high signal value for conspecifics. 
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These multiple functions, the large number of component 
elements involved, the complexity of efferent and afferent neu-
ral transmissions, and the need to consider influences both 
within the individual and in others results in an extremely high 
noise-to-signal ratio that creates significant challenges for 
researchers searching for patterned ANS activity.
To illustrate this challenge, consider the search for ANS “sig-
natures” associated with particular emotions. The ANS is by 
design a slave to many masters, with emotion being just one of 
the many. Thus, at any given moment, a change in ANS activity 
that is detected in the laboratory is more likely to result from the 
action of a nonemotional master rather than an emotional one. 
Let’s suppose that there is, in fact, an ANS signature associated 
with a particular emotion that includes increased pupil dilation, 
decreased tonus of the smooth muscles surrounding the fine air-
ways in the lung, and increased cardiac contractile force. And 
further, let’s suppose that these ANS functions are monitored 
and quantified continuously during a given day in the life of an 
individual. Throughout that day, we can expect numerous occur-
rences of these ANS changes, sometimes in isolation and some-
times together. But, when they do occur, they are far more likely 
to result from more prosaic homeostatic demands rather than 
emotion. Thus, changes in pupillary diameter are most likely to 
result from changes in ambient light levels, changes in airway 
tonus are most likely to result from metabolic factors that alter 
oxygen demands, and changes in cardiac contractility are most 
likely to result from the need to alter hemodynamics to support 
changes in posture. Simply stated, on most of the days of most 
of our lives, standing up and turning toward the light is a much 
more likely and parsimonious explanation for this particular 
configuration of ANS changes than being in the throes of an 
emotion such as “anger” or “fear.”
These biological realities create formidable challenges for 
attempts to characterize the ANS changes associated with par-
ticular emotions, requiring careful sifting through the ongoing 
flow of behavior to separate emotional moments from nonemo-
tional ones. Just as these realities work against efforts to identify 
physiological concomitants of emotions, they create even more 
daunting problems for attempts to infer emotion and other psy-
chological states on the basis of observed patterns of ANS activ-
ity. As examples of the latter, it seems particularly imprudent to 
conclude ipso facto that a person whose respiratory sinus 
arrhythmia increases is in a state of positive emotion or is a 
compassionate person.
Three Common Misconceptions about the ANS 
and Its Role in Emotion
In this article, I will be claiming that many of the problems that 
plague the literatures on ANS coherence and specificity in emo-
tion are methodological in nature. However, no consideration of 
the role of the ANS in emotion would be complete without tak-
ing note of some of the common assertions about ANS function-
ing that simply go against neural realities, can lead to 
misinformed conclusions about underlying neural mechanisms, 
and, thus, complicate interpretations of findings and add a cer-
tain degree of confusion to the literature.
The first misconception is that the SNS is the “go,” “acti-
vating,” or “energizing” system, and the PNS is the “braking,” 
“calming,” or “resting” system. Although this metaphor might 
fit the heart (see previous discussion of ANS control of heart 
rate), in other parts of the ANS it is the PNS that is clearly the 
activating system. Importantly, these PNS-activated systems 
include many of the target organs that are critically involved in 
emotion. Thus, for example, the PNS causes increased activa-
tion in salivary glands (salivation), tear ducts (crying), and the 
gut (e.g., stomach and intestinal activity).
The second misconception is that measures of heart rate vari-
ability (including respiratory sinus arrhythmia) are indicators of 
activity of the entire vagus nerve or, even worse, the entire para-
sympathetic nervous system. Measures of vagal influence on the 
heart are just that. It is highly unlikely that they serve as proxy 
measures of the action of the vagus on other important target 
organs (e.g., the stomach, liver, small intestine, kidney). 
Moreover, it is even less likely that they serve as proxy measures 
of the action of other PNS nerves (e.g., the sacral nerve, which 
serves the colon, rectum, bladder, and genitalia, or the seventh 
cranial nerve, which serves salivation and crying).
The third misconception is that the ANS primarily serves to 
increase and decrease activity in target organs (i.e., efferent 
functions). The reality is quite different. For example, the 
majority of neural traffic in the vagus nerve is not efferent in 
nature, but rather afferent, with vagal fibers providing a neural 
highway that transports critical information about the state of 
the bodily milieu back to the brain. These afferent functions are 
extremely important when theorizing about the role the ANS 
plays in emotion, especially when thinking about so-called 
“bottom-up” influences (e.g., the influence of emotional arousal 
on cognition) and peripheralist models that stress the influence 
of visceral feedback in emotion (e.g., in creating subjective 
emotional experience).
Why Patterning? The Evolutionary/
functionalist Model
Many of us grew up in an era dominated by cognitive models 
of emotion (Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus, Averill, & Opton, 1970; 
Mandler, 1975; Schachter & Singer, 1962). This “top-down” 
view, which envisions emotions as resulting from the computa-
tions of higher order brain centers, continues to be quite vibrant. 
This can be seen, for example, in appraisal theories of emotion 
(Scherer, 1982; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), which articulate a 
set of cognitive operations that lead to different emotions. The 
top-down view also assumes an important role in modern con-
ceptualizations of how emotions are regulated (Gross, 1998; 
Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Shiota & Levenson, 2009), with 
emphasis placed on the capacity of higher order appraisals 
(e.g., reframing, distancing) to alter the activation, intensity, 
and duration of emotions. In these cognitive models, patterning 
plays an important role in the thoughts and appraisals that lead 
to and modulate emotions, but patterning in attendant ANS 
activation is generally not as critical (for an appraisal model 
that allows for patterned ANS activity, see Scherer, 1984).
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Evolutionary/functionalist models are quite different in their 
view of the role of the ANS in emotion. In part because of their 
interest in features of emotion that show continuity across spe-
cies, they are less likely to view higher level thought processes 
as necessary precursors and initiators of emotion. Instead, they 
typically endorse a “bottom-up” view, with ANS and other 
peripheral responses shaping the subjective experience of emo-
tion (at least in humans) and influencing cognitive functioning 
(James, 1884; Levenson, 1999, 2011). A defining feature of 
evolutionary/functionalist models is the belief that different 
emotions were preserved in evolution because they provided 
generalized solutions to common problems (Tooby & Cosmides, 
1990). Because the problems that different emotions address are 
quite different, so are the solutions. These different solutions, 
each involving particular behavioral activities with their atten-
dant biological support, provide the conceptual underpinnings 
for the specificity hypothesis, which predicts that different emo-
tions will be associated with different patterns of biobehavioral 
activity. This logic can be seen in the schematic model of an 
emotion presented in Figure 1.
The figure illustrates how exposure to a blood injury leads to 
the emotion of disgust. Inputs from organs of sensation are 
monitored continuously by phylogenetically ancient brain cent-
ers (e.g., amygdala) in a rapid appraisal process that is designed 
to detect a small number of well-defined patterns of sensory 
input that are particularly relevant for the organism’s survival 
and well-being (e.g., visual, sensory, and olfactory cues that 
denote disease and decay). When one of these patterns is 
detected, an emotion (in this case, disgust) is activated. Emotions 
such as disgust represent highly generalized solutions that are 
most likely to enable the organism to deal effectively with these 
common challenges or opportunities most of the time. These 
emotions have the capacity to “interrupt” ongoing activity 
throughout the peripheral and central nervous system and 
reallocate resources to the problem at hand. They create pat-
terned activation within the ANS and between the ANS and 
other biological systems (e.g., motor programs, vocalization, 
facial expression) that is both coherent and specific. This pat-
terned ANS activation is optimal for supporting adaptive behav-
iors and for communicating critical information to conspecifics. 
Thus, in the case of an encounter with disease and decay, the 
emotion of disgust rapidly prepares the individual to withdraw 
from, shut off, and expel the undesirable substance. Along the 
way, associated changes in vocalization (“yuck” and gagging 
sounds), expression (nose wrinkling), and posture (pulling 
back) also provide valuable signals to conspecifics that can acti-
vate their emotions and mobilize and guide their behaviors.
In many evolutionary/functionalist views, subjective emo-
tional experience is not a core feature of emotion, but rather 
arises after information becomes available from biological sen-
sors that detect changes in temperature, pressure, posture, tonus, 
and movement (Levenson, 1999). This proprioceptive and inter-
oceptive information is integrated in subcortical brain centers 
such as the anterior insula (Craig, 2009) and made available to 
higher brain centers. To the extent that different emotions have 
different patterns of associated somatic and visceral activity, 
they “feel” differently to us (e.g., the subjective experience 
of disgust is quite different than the subjective experience of 
Figure 1. Schematic model of emotion elicitation.
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sadness). These different feelings create links to memories of 
other related experiences (e.g., other encounters with blood 
injuries), motivate coping/regulatory behaviors (e.g., to reduce 
the unpleasant visceral sensations), and may stimulate addi-
tional emotional responses (e.g., evoking amusement over hav-
ing had a strong emotional reaction in a situation that proved to 
be benign rather than threatening).
These additional emotional responses are important to 
account for in studies of ANS specificity in emotion. For exam-
ple, contemporary research participants, raised with massive 
exposure to “gross-out” humor, are highly likely to laugh when 
exposed to disgusting stimuli (in fact, they often laugh when 
merely seeing another person assume a facial display of dis-
gust). For a study purporting to examine ANS activity associ-
ated with disgust, when many or most subjects are laughing, it 
is easy to end up studying the ANS activity associated with the 
emotion related to the laughter (e.g., embarrassment, amuse-
ment, unfelt happiness, etc.) rather than the target emotion of 
disgust.
ANS Patterning in Emotion: Multiple 
Variants
The evolutionary/functionalist model of emotion I have out-
lined suggests that two major variants of ANS patterning should 
exist in emotion, coherence and specificity. Moreover, each of 
these variants should be manifest in several different ways. With 
coherence, emotions are seen as increasing the level of organi-
zation: (a) within the ANS, and (b) between the ANS and other 
response systems. With specificity, particular emotions are seen 
as being associated with different patterns of ANS activity, 
which should be manifest in: (a) ANS functions that are not 
readily visible (e.g., changes in heart rate); (b) ANS functions 
that are readily visible and have high communicative value 
(e.g., blushing, piloerection, crying); and (c) physical sensations 
derived from ANS activity that are experienced subjectively 
(e.g., sensations of heat and pressure). In the following sections, 
I will discuss ANS patterning in emotion in terms of both 
coherence and specificity. For each kind of patterning, I will 
discuss the theoretical foundations, the obstacles that need to be 
overcome to conduct sound empirical studies, and the current 
state of the associated empirical literatures.
Coherence
Philosophical and psychological traditions tracing back to Plato 
and Freud have depicted emotions as the antithesis of rational 
thought. Viewed from this vantage point, emotions produce 
chaos rather than order, interfere with the conduct of planned 
action, and lead to maladaptive consequences. Evolutionary/
functionalist models envision a dramatically different landscape 
in which emotions impose order and coherence across disparate 
bio-behavioral systems (Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1992; Frijda, 
1986; Levenson, 1994; Tomkins, 1962), support effective 
action, and lead to adaptive consequences. In the evolutionary/
functionalist view, emotions are the royal road to coordinated, 
effective responses to challenges and opportunities. Rational 
thought, in extremis, can interfere with the natural flow of emo-
tional responding, leading to chaotic and maladaptive action.
Along these lines, I have noted that “the essential function of 
emotion is organization” (Levenson, 1994, p. 124), describing 
this organizational function as follows: “Physiologically, emo-
tions rapidly organize the responses of different biological sys-
tems including facial expression, muscular tonus, voice, 
autonomic nervous system activity, and endocrine activity to 
produce a bodily milieu that is optimal for effective response” 
(Levenson, 1994, p. 124) and
Response coherence implies that emotions organize and synchronize 
different response systems … such that when we are in the throes of a 
strong emotion, our subjective, behavioral, and physiological responses 
should track each other more closely than when we are at rest. (Sze, 
Gyurak, Yuan, & Levenson, 2010, p. 803)
As noted before, it is important to consider coherence both 
within the ANS and between the ANS and other response sys-
tems. Examining data obtained during an episode of relatively 
intense emotion may help illustrate these two kinds of coher-
ence. Figure 2 depicts two aspects of ANS responding (cardio-
vascular and electrodermal) and facial responding (behavioral 
coding of disgust expressions) measured continuously from an 
individual participating in a study in our laboratory. This par-
ticipant was shown an excerpt from an industrial safety film (“It 
Didn’t Have to Happen”) that portrays a factory worker severely 
cutting his hand on a saw blade.
Although this film often elicits amusement in addition to dis-
gust in contemporary subjects, this particular subject reported 
primarily feeling disgust with no amusement. Moreover, careful 
coding of his facial behavior using the facial action coding sys-
tem (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1978) revealed three episodes of 
facial behavior during the film, all consistent with high levels of 
disgust (e.g., high intensity nose wrinkling [FACS Action Unit 
9]). This participant showed no facial expressive signs of 
amusement or any other emotion.
Figure 2 presents: (a) second-by-second averages of the par-
ticipant’s normalized heart rate (solid black line), (b) second-
by-second averages of normalized skin conductance (grey line), 
and the apex (i.e., the moment of maximal muscle contraction) 
of each of the three disgust expressions (black disk superim-
posed on the heart rate line). During the first 35 seconds of the 
film (seconds 55–90 on the X axis), the characters in the film 
engage in various fairly benign activities. During this time, the 
subject sat quietly and watched the film as instructed (his eyes 
were open and his head position was straight ahead). Examining 
the physiological activity during this period, there is little coor-
dination or similarity visible in the pattern of activity in the two 
ANS measures (heart rate and skin conductance), nor is there 
any visible emotional facial behavior. This state of affairs is 
typical of the low coherence that exists both within the ANS and 
between the ANS and facial expression when no emotion is pre-
sent. If a statistical measure of the degree of association were 
applied (e.g., a within-subject time-lagged correlation), the rela-
tionship would be near zero.
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In the 27-second period starting with the depiction of the 
accident (seconds 88–115 on the X axis) things change dramati-
cally. Within the first second following the accident, heart rate 
and skin conductance both increase sharply (skin conductance 
increases more slowly, which is consistent with the temporal 
dynamics of these ANS systems). This parallel coactivation is 
the first sign of within-ANS coherence. Moreover, if you men-
tally smooth out the faster perturbations, both ANS functions 
show a similar underlying “arc” of activation and deactivation 
over the ensuing 25 seconds. Focusing on the faster perturba-
tions, there are cycles of rise and fall that occur every 8–10 sec-
onds in both heart rate and skin conductance. These likely 
reflect the participant’s rapid and deep breathing in response to 
the accident scene. Thus, in a number of different time domains, 
there is strong visual evidence of coordinated activation and 
deactivation of these two ANS functions after the accident 
occurs. If we were to apply a statistical measure of coherence to 
the ANS data during this emotional period following the acci-
dent, it would produce much higher values than during the non-
emotional period prior to the accident.
Examining the ANS and facial behavior during the period 
following the accident illustrates coherence between these two 
different response systems. The first disgust expression occurs 
in the first second after the accident occurs, coinciding with the 
onset of the sharp increases in heart rate and skin conductance. 
The second disgust expression occurs at the first peak in heart 
rate. Immediately following that facial expression, heart rate 
drops to a lower level and then starts to increase again. The third 
disgust expression occurs at the next peak in heart rate (the 
highest level it reaches during the film). Again, immediately fol-
lowing the expression, heart rate begins to drop. Thus, during 
this period of intense emotional response, bursts of facial 
expression are associated with both the initial onset of ANS 
responding (in heart rate and skin conductance) and with its 
peaks (particularly in heart rate).
These data are meant to be illustrative. They come from a 
single subject chosen because he had a strong disgust response 
to the film in self-report and facial expression (he was chosen 
completely blind to his physiology and to the relationship 
between his physiology and facial behavior). Thus, there are 
certainly legitimate issues that can be raised concerning gener-
alizability. However, I believe there is considerable heuristic 
value in this kind of careful within-subject analysis of coactiva-
tion of multiple response systems before and during the occur-
rence of a strong emotion. It hopefully makes much clearer what 
coherence within the ANS and between the ANS and another 
response system looks like. If this example does, in fact, capture 
the essential nature of these two kinds of coherence, then it has 
profound implications for the kinds of experimental designs, 
manipulation checks, and data analytic techniques that are nec-
essary to provide an adequate empirical test of the coherence 
hypothesis.
Obstacles. Progress in determining whether emotions do, in 
fact, organize and produce coherence within the ANS and 
between the ANS and other response systems has been hampered 
greatly by the lack of studies using experimental designs that are 
sensitive to the kinds of coordination within and across systems 
that are portrayed in Figure 2. To be able to assess and quantify 
these kinds of coherence, a study would need to meet three crite-
ria: (a) subjective, behavioral, and physiological responses need 
to be measured continuously over time within individuals; (b) dif-
ferent temporal characteristics of various response systems need 
to be accounted for; and (c) levels of coherence must be measured 
when subjects are actually in the throes of a strong emotional 
experience. In a recent review of the literature on coherence (Sze 
et al., 2010), we found only one study that had assessed coher-
ence in ways that met all three of these criteria.
Most of the existing research on coherence has failed to meet 
the first criterion, choosing a between-subjects rather than a 
within-subjects approach. In the between-subjects approach, 
subjects typically are exposed to an emotion elicitor, and their 
responses (averaged over some unit of time) are derived for at 
least two measures. Between-subjects correlations are then 
determined. Thus, if the film-viewing study used  in the within-
subject design portrayed in Figure 2 were used in a between-
subjects design, a group of subjects would watch the accident 
film and their mean heart rate, mean skin conductance, and 
average intensity of disgust expressions would be determined 
for the 27-second period following the accident. Then the cor-
relation between heart rate, skin conductance, and disgust inten-
sity would be computed across subjects.
The between-subjects correlation derived from this kind of 
study essentially tests whether individuals who have relatively 
Seconds
55 65 75 85 95 105 115
AccidentFilm starts
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Face
Figure 2. Autonomic and facial responses to industrial accident film.
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larger heart rate responses (as compared to other subjects) also 
have relatively large (or relatively small) skin conductance and 
disgust facial expression responses. This is a very interesting 
research question in its own right, examining an individual dif-
ference that might have important relationships with health and 
well-being (e.g., Kring & Neale, 1996; Weinberger, Schwartz, 
& Davidson, 1979). However, this kind of between-subjects 
study does not provide a test of coherence as envisioned in 
evolutionary/functionalist theories or as illustrated in the previ-
ous within-subject example.
Although not the focus of the present article, it is worth not-
ing that the literature using the between-subjects/individual dif-
ference approach has not yielded consistent findings, with 
studies reporting positive relationships (Lanzetta, Cartwright-
Smith, & Kleck, 1976), no relationships (Mauss, Wilhelm, & 
Gross, 2004), and negative relationships (Buck, Miller, & Caul, 
1974; Notarius & Levenson, 1979) among response systems. 
The latter findings, usually taking the form of a negative corre-
lation between physiological and facial response has often been 
interpreted as providing support for classic “hydraulic” or “dis-
charge” models of emotion (i.e., when emotions are expressed 
strongly through one response channel, they exhaust the avail-
able energy and are expressed weakly through other channels; 
Notarius & Levenson, 1979). Again, albeit highly interesting 
and theoretically rich, studies using these between-subjects 
designs should not be interpreted as testing the capacity of emo-
tion to increase coherence within and between response systems 
within individuals over time.
Empirical support. As noted earlier, in our recent review 
of the coherence literature, we found only one prior study that 
met all three of the criteria stated before. This was a study from 
our research group (Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & 
Gross, 2005) that utilized: (a) continuous measures of ANS 
physiology, expressive behavior (observational coding of video 
recordings), and subjective-emotional experience (using a rat-
ing dial methodology; Gottman & Levenson, 1985); (b) within-
subject time-lagged correlations that allowed for different 
temporal dynamics across responses to characterize coherence; 
and (c) verification that subjects were in the targeted emotional 
state. This study found quite strong evidence for coherence 
across response systems. For example, during a film that tar-
geted sadness, the within-subject lagged correlation (averaged 
across participants) between self-reported emotional experience 
and facial behavior was r = 0.74 and between facial behavior 
and skin conductance level was r = −0.52. In addition to being 
statistically significant, these fall in the range of what are gener-
ally considered to be large effect sizes (Cohen, 1977). This is 
particularly impressive given that in this kind of experimental 
design the measures of emotional experience, behavior, and 
physiology share minimal common method variance.
We recently completed another study using this methodology 
(Sze et al., 2010). This second study explored possible 
contributors to individual differences in the coherence between 
physiology and subjective emotional experience. We found that 
the average within-subject coherence between physiology and 
subjective experience was greater among subjects who had exten-
sive experience with Vipassana meditation (which has a strong 
focus on attending to visceral states) compared to those who had 
extensive dance experience (which has a strong focus on attend-
ing to somatic states) and controls. Again, the evidence for coher-
ence was quite strong. Examining the average within-subject 
lagged correlations between self-reported emotion and heart 
period among the meditators revealed that these correlations were 
statistically significant and fell into the range of medium to large 
effect sizes (i.e., the average correlation for the film that produced 
the greatest coherence across subjects was r = .50; the average 
across all four films that were used was r = .35).
Despite these findings, I expect that many emotion research-
ers share the conclusion found in recent reviews of the literature 
(Barrett, 2006; Mauss & Robinson, 2009) that coherence across 
emotion response systems is quite low. However, it is important 
to note that almost none of the studies included in these reviews 
use what I have argued is a minimally adequate research design 
for testing the kinds of coherence envisioned in the evolutionary/
functionalist theories. Moreover, as noted before, the few studies 
that have used appropriate designs suggest a quite different con-
clusion, with moderate to high levels of coherence occurring 
when individuals are in the throes of emotion. Given the impor-
tant role that coherence plays in many theories of emotion and its 
possible relationships with health and well-being, this is clearly 
an area that would benefit from additional research using the 
most appropriate methods possible.
Specificity
The idea that different emotions have different patterns of atten-
dant ANS activity grows directly out of a central tenet of the 
evolutionary/functionalist model. In this model, emotions help 
the organism deal effectively and efficiently with a set of com-
mon problems that are critical for species survival. Examples of 
these problems include: defending what is ours, avoiding harm, 
recruiting support from conspecifics, and restoring calm 
(Levenson, 2003a; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Consistent with 
this view, to the extent that these solutions involve different 
kinds of behaviors and that these behaviors require different 
configurations of ANS activation to provide optimal support, 
then eliciting these emotions should produce different patterns 
of ANS activity.
Although the focus of this article is on the role of the ANS in 
emotion, it is important to realize that this argument for ANS 
specificity can readily be applied to the other response systems 
depicted in Figure 1. This notion is consistent with the view that 
each emotion has an affect program (Tomkins, 1962), with “sub-
routines” that control the action of different response systems. 
Thus, different emotions should be associated with different 
patterns of facial expressions (Ekman, 1984; Ekman, Friesen, & 
Ellsworth, 1972), vocalization (Scherer, 1989), and motor activ-
ity (Frijda, 1986; James, 1884). As with ANS specificity, the lit-
eratures that have arisen around specificity in facial expression, 
vocalization, and motor activity have often been fraught with 
controversy (e.g., Ekman, 1994; Russell, 1994).
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Obstacles. Humans have emotions all the time and physi-
ological recording equipment is widely available and relatively 
inexpensive. Thus, one might think that research on ANS speci-
ficity would be quite easy to conduct. To the contrary, there are 
a number of significant obstacles and challenges that need to be 
overcome if research on ANS specificity in emotion is to 
advance beyond its current state and if clarity is to replace 
controversy.
Verifying emotional states. Evolutionary/functionalist 
models posit that patterned activity in bio-behavioral response 
systems will occur when the individual is in the throes of a par-
ticular emotion. Thus, actually having a particular emotion is 
a necessary condition for testing this model. In an earlier era 
before human subjects protections were in place, subjects were 
typically placed in situations that powerfully created the ante-
cedent conditions thought to produce particular emotions. For 
example, in a classic study of fear and anger (Ax, 1953), partici-
pants were either placed in a situation of high threat (thinking 
they were about to be electrocuted by faulty equipment) or high 
frustration (being forced to repeat menial tasks and exposed to 
high levels of criticism by the experimenter) to produce fear and 
anger respectively. These in vivo situations were well aligned 
with classic views of the antecedent conditions that produce fear 
(i.e., imminent bodily harm) and anger (i.e., unjust treatment 
and frustration). In contrast, subjects in contemporary studies of 
emotion are more likely to be asked to: (a) view still or moving 
images of emotionally significant objects (e.g., guns, gore, pup-
pies) or that depict people in emotional situations (e.g., being 
in danger, engaging in revolting acts, doing adorable things); 
(b) remember or imagine times when they felt emotions; (c) hear 
or view lists of emotional words; (d) listen to music or other 
emotionally evocative sounds; or (e) make facial expressions 
or watch others make emotional facial expressions. Consistent 
with this, a recent review of 134 published studies of ANS spec-
ificity (Kreibig, 2010) found that films were the most common 
emotion elicitors used, followed by personalized memories, and 
then by real-life manipulations.
In decades of trying to induce emotion in the laboratory 
using almost every one of these methods, one verity that has 
emerged for me is that there is no guarantee that any particular 
stimulus will produce any particular emotion in any particular 
individual at any given time. Thus, no matter how carefully the 
emotion elicitor is designed and delivered, for studies consider-
ing whether particular emotions produce different patterns of 
ANS activity, there must be some independent verification that 
a participant is actually having the emotions of interest. This is 
particularly important in contemporary studies; with milder 
emotion elicitors there is even greater likelihood that individual 
participants will respond to experimental manipulations in emo-
tionally different ways. Thus, a study purporting to compare the 
ANS activity associated with fear and anger, for example, may 
include many participants who do not experience one or the 
other of these emotions at any reasonable level of intensity, oth-
ers who experience quite different nontargeted emotions (e.g., 
amusement, embarrassment), and yet others who experience 
complex sequences of emotion that may or may not include the 
emotions of interest.
How should emotional state be verified? Following the ten-
ets of evolutionary/functionalist models of emotion, the best 
evidence that an emotion has been elicited will come from care-
ful examination of multiple emotion response systems. In stud-
ies of ANS specificity, to avoid circularity, verification must be 
based on response systems other than the ANS (e.g., facial, 
motor, vocal responses). Because there are reasonable argu-
ments that can be raised against endowing any particular 
response system with “gold standard” status (Mauss & 
Robinson, 2009), it is useful to seek convergent evidence across 
multiple response systems to establish which emotions have 
been elicited and when (see following section on the importance 
of establishing the timing of emotion onset and offset). What 
about verification by self-report? In models such as the one pre-
sented in Figure 2, self-reported emotional experience is not 
considered part of the initial emotional response but rather is 
constructed after the fact (Levenson, 1999, 2011). Nonetheless, 
self-report may provide an additional level of convergent evi-
dence for verification when available.
This leads to the important question of what to do with veri-
fication data once collected. Strikingly, many studies in the 
ANS specificity literature did not verify emotion at all, depend-
ing on a priori assumptions about what emotions were being 
evoked. Among those that did verify, it has been common to use 
these data as an overall manipulation check to show that condi-
tion A did in fact produce more of emotion X, and condition B 
did in fact produce more of emotion Y. Most commonly, having 
established this, the researcher then analyzes data from all par-
ticipants on all trials. This approach maximizes usable data but 
undercuts the rationale for verification. A fair test of ANS spec-
ificity of emotion requires it be tested only on trials where there 
is good evidence that the target emotion (and no other emotion) 
has occurred.
The importance of verification for testing the hypothesis of 
ANS specificity in emotion can be illustrated with an example 
from our own research. In this study, we (Levenson, Ekman, & 
Friesen, 1990) tested ANS specificity using a directed facial 
action task in which participants were given muscle-by-muscle 
instructions that, if followed, would produce prototypical facial 
expressions of six different emotions (Ekman & Friesen, 1975). 
In the verification stage of the analysis, we used FACS coding 
of facial behavior to establish the extent to which the target 
emotion (and no other) was present on the face. In a subject-by-
subject analysis of four ANS differences among anger, fear, 
disgust, and sadness facial configurations, we found that ANS 
differences occurred at greater than chance levels on trials on 
which facial configurations met the highest verification standards, 
but at less than chance levels on trials where the verification 
standards were not met. Thus, conclusions about ANS specific-
ity in this study would be completely different if based on the 
nonverified rather than verified data.
Intensity. In the canonical examples of emotion that accom-
pany the evolutionary/functionalist model, the world is cruel and 
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brutish; antecedent conditions are powerful, unambiguous, and 
quick to onset; appraisal is fast and automatic; and bio-behavioral 
responses are large in magnitude and involve multiple response 
systems (e.g., a tiger jumps from its hiding place, the person 
immediately experiences intense, full-blown fear with racing and 
pounding heart, frightened vocalizations, classic facial display of 
fear, and runs as fast as possible for safety). However, as we move 
away from these prototypical emotion elicitors into the kinder 
and gentler laboratory variants, antecedent conditions are typi-
cally more ambiguous, less prototypical, and slower to develop. 
Moreover, appraisals are less automatic and more prone to be 
quickly modified by reappraisals that serve emotion regulatory 
goals. The emotions that result in these latter situations are likely 
to be much lower in intensity, more fleeting (perhaps segueing 
into other emotions), and more likely to produce measurable 
activity in some but not all response systems. Finding elicitors 
that produce reasonably high-intensity emotions without trigger-
ing human subjects concerns can be challenging, but is essential 
for studying ANS specificity.
If high-intensity emotions are critical for providing a fair 
test of ANS specificity, low-intensity emotions are also impor-
tant for understanding the relationship between patterned ANS 
activity and emotional intensity (Levenson, 1988). It may be 
that ANS differentiation increases linearly as emotional inten-
sity increases, but other relationships are certainly possible. 
For example, there may be a threshold of intensity below 
which patterned ANS activity does not occur, and a threshold 
above which ANS activity becomes more diffuse and undif-
ferentiated. Having data available to test these linear and non-
linear models will require developing emotion elicitors that 
are effective for producing a range of intensity levels and char-
acterizing the degree of ANS specificity at different intensity 
levels.
Broadly assessing ANS functions. Most research on ANS 
specificity has focused on ANS measures that are fairly easy to 
obtain and quantify, primarily heart rate and skin conductance/
resistance (Kreibig, 2010). Although these measures represent 
aspects of cardiovascular and electrodermal processes that are 
important in emotion, they are insufficient for characterizing the 
full gamut of ANS responses in emotion. Respiration, for exam-
ple, plays a critical role in preparing the organism for adaptive 
action in emotion, but it often is not assessed in studies of ANS 
specificity. The activity of the gastrointestinal system in emotion 
has been studied even less, which is ironic given how common 
references to “gut feelings” are and how frequently gastrointes-
tinal activity appears in metaphors associated with particular 
emotions (e.g., butterflies in the stomach during fear; stomach 
turning during disgust). Perhaps because of their rareness, gas-
trointestinal measures were not included in a recent cataloging 
of measures in the literature on ANS specificity (Kreibig, 2010). 
Such studies do exist, but they are rare (e.g., Baldaro, Gattacchi, 
Codispoti, & Tuozzi, 1996; Harrison, Gray, Gianaros, & Critch-
ley, 2010; Vianna & Tranel, 2006), perhaps reflecting some of 
the challenges involved in detecting and quantifying gastrointes-
tinal activity (Stern, Kock, Stewart, & Vasey, 1987).
One of the great ironies in research on ANS specificity has 
been the almost exclusive focus on the least visible forms of 
ANS activity and the near complete neglect of the most visible 
signs of ANS activity. This is particularly ironical because the 
high levels of specificity might be expected to occur in ANS 
measures that have the greatest signal value for conspecifics. I 
believe that one reason for this neglect is that, when it comes to 
visible, socially informative signs of emotion, the facial muscu-
lature has been the “alpha dog.” This is, of course, understand-
able. With its 40-plus muscles, ideal location (at eye level) for 
viewing by others, and dual enervation that allows for both vol-
untary and involuntary action (Rinn, 1984), the face is an entic-
ing target for researchers interested in specificity in the visible 
signs of emotion.
Without diminishing the important role the facial muscles 
play in conveying information about specific emotional states, it 
is important to note that the ANS also is a rich source of such 
information. Several years ago, I (Levenson, 2003b) compiled a 
list of visible changes that are mediated by the ANS and that 
might be linked to specific emotions (see Table 1). Compared to 
studies of the less visible forms of ANS response, studies of 
these more visible forms have been quite rare. This is not due to 
measurement difficulty; many of the most highly visible ANS 
changes can be measured using common psychophysiological 
transducers (e.g., blushing via photoplethysmography; Shearn, 
Bergman, Hill, Abel, & Hinds, 1990) or direct observation (e.g., 
crying; Gross, Fredrickson, & Levenson, 1994). Moreover, for 
those who believe in ANS specificity, these visible ANS-
mediated changes arguably provide some of the lowest hanging 
fruit available for testing this view (e.g., is blushing more com-
mon in embarrassment than in fear, is blanching more common 
in fear than in anger, or is crying more common in sadness than 
in disgust?). This is clearly an important area for future research 
and one that could prove very informative in evaluating the 
extent of ANS specificity in emotion.
To detect ANS differences among a set of several emotions, 
obviously there needs to be more than a single measure. But rather 
than just adding additional measures based on convenience, it would 
be useful to select measures more thoughtfully. Selection criteria for 
measures could include a desire to sample broadly from major ANS 
response systems (e.g., cardiac, vascular, electrodermal, gastrointes-
tinal, etc.) or could be shaped by ideas about associated behaviors 
(e.g., what are the most relevant ANS systems for supporting and 
signaling freezing/fleeing, fighting, or withdrawing/expulsion in a 
study comparing fear, anger, and disgust).
Fully characterizing the activity of particular autonomic sys-
tems. Psychophysiological measurement in research on ANS 
specificity needs to strive for a richer and more complete char-
acterization of the important operating parameters of the target 
organ systems. For example, consider the cardiovascular system. 
As noted earlier, measures of heart rate are the single most com-
mon measure in studies of ANS specificity in emotion (Kreibig, 
2010). Heart rate provides useful information on the frequency 
of cardiac contractions and is highly reactive to changes in mus-
cle activity (Obrist, Webb, Sutterer, & Howard, 1970). Moreover, 
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changes in muscle activity are critically involved in behavioral 
adjustments (e.g., fighting, fleeing, freezing, fondling) thought 
to distinguish among emotions in the evolutionary/functionalist 
view. However, heart rate only represents the tip of the iceberg 
when it comes to characterizing the activity of the cardiovascular 
system. A comprehensive assessment of cardiovascular function-
ing in emotion would include measures of other cardiac functions 
such as the force of contractions (cardiac contractility) and the 
amount of blood leaving the left ventricle on each contraction 
(cardiac output). It would also include multiple measures of vas-
cular functioning such as the amount of blood flow in multiple 
areas of the body important in emotion (e.g., hands, feet, face) and 
changes in the resistance of the vascular system. Moreover, emo-
tion researchers have become increasingly interested in specify-
ing the relative activity of the parasympathetic and sympathetic 
branches of the ANS. As noted earlier, because it is influenced 
by both of these branches, heart rate cannot, by itself, reveal their 
relative activation. To do so requires more complex analyses 
such as spectral analysis of heart rate variability (Akselrod et al., 
1981) computation of respiratory sinus arrhythmia (Grossman, 
van Beek, & Wientjes, 1990), or using more specialized methods 
of detecting and quantifying cardiovascular activity (e.g., imped-
ance cardiography; Sherwood et al., 1990).
Timing. Based on facial expressions, emotions appear to 
last less than 5 seconds (Ekman, 1984). Longer emotional epi-
sodes certainly do occur, but they often are made up of multiple 
bursts of facial expression (e.g., the three bursts in Figure 2). 
Given the view presented earlier that most of the time, the ANS 
is not acting in the service of emotion, it is critical to assess 
ANS activity during those moments when it actually is under 
the influence of emotion, not when the reigns of the ANS are in 
the hands of its other masters.
Viewed from this perspective, the history of research on 
ANS specificity has been plagued by problems related to the 
timing of measured ANS response. In an earlier review of this 
literature (Levenson, 1988), I discussed this issue in some detail 
and noted how many of the classic studies in the ANS specific-
ity literature (e.g., Funkenstein, King, & Drolette, 1954; 
Schachter & Singer, 1962) had gone to considerable lengths to 
elicit emotion, but that the measurement of ANS activity did not 
occur until well after the elicitation procedure was over.
The timing of ANS measurement may be even more impor-
tant in the contemporary era, where the emotion elicitors are 
typically less powerful and the emotions they produce are less 
intense and more fleeting. In the most recent review of the lit-
erature on ANS specificity, Kreibig (2010) did not evaluate 
studies in terms of whether they ensured that the timing of ANS 
responses matched the onset and duration of emotion, but did 
assess the length of measured ANS response. The most com-
mon response duration was 60 or 30 seconds, and other com-
mon averaging intervals included 2, 3, and 5 minutes. Thus, 
even if the onset of ANS measurement was closely matched to 
the onset of emotion (established by some independent criteria 
such as the onset of facial activity, which is still unfortunately 
rare), the duration of ANS measurement in these studies was 
bound to include large stretches of nonemotional ANS activity.
Assessing physical sensations. The role that physical sen-
sations (i.e., information from the viscera and muscles) play 
in emotion has long been of interest. In James’s (1884) influ-
ential view, these sensations constituted the essential building 
blocks for emotion. This notion has stimulated several waves 
of research. Early research focused on assessing individual dif-
ferences in awareness of visceral information using question-
naires (Mandler, Mandler, & Uviller, 1958). In search of more 
Table 1. Visible ANS-mediated changes in emotion (adapted from Levenson, 2003b)
Type Change ANS-mediated Basis Emotion
Coloration Reddening Vasodilation, increased contractility Anger
 Blushing Vasodilation Embarrassment
 Blanching Vasoconstriction Fear
Moisture and secretions Sweating, clamminess Sweat glands Fear
 Salivating, drooling Salivary glands Disgust
 Foaming Salivary glands Anger
 Tearing, crying Lacrimal glands Sadness
 Lubricating Mucus membranes Sexual arousal
Protrusions Piloerection Muscle fibers at base of hair follicles Fear, anger
 Genital erection Vasodilation Sexual arousal
 Blood vessels bulging Vasodilation Anger
Appearance of eyes Constriction Pupils Anger
 Dilation Pupils Fear
 Bulging eyes Eyelid muscles Anger, fear
 Drooping lids Eyelid muscles Sexual arousal
 Twinkling Lacrimal glands plus contraction of 
orbicularis oculi
Happiness
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objective measures, researchers later developed elaborate labo-
ratory tasks that assessed the ability to discern small changes 
in ANS functions such as heart rate (Brener & Jones, 1974; 
Katkin, Blascovich, & Goldband, 1981; Whitehead, Drescher, 
Heiman, & Blackwell, 1977). The general conclusion from this 
latter work was that most individuals were not very accurate 
in perceiving these small changes in heart rate. However, the 
relevance of these tests for the visceral perception that occurs 
during emotion was not clear.
A revival of interest in the role of physical sensations came 
with work that was less concerned with the accuracy of per-
ceptions and more with the psychological processes that influ-
enced visceral awareness and the reporting of physical 
symptoms (Pennebaker, 1982). This was followed by a series 
of cross-national studies that showed consistency in the asso-
ciations between particular sensations and particular emotions 
(Scherer & Wallbott, 1994), linguistic studies of the physio-
logical content of emotional metaphors (e.g., heat and pres-
sure; Lakoff, 1987), and work that showed that activity of the 
facial muscles (presumably via feedback mechanisms) could 
produce (Levenson et al., 1990) and modulate (Strack, Martin, 
& Stepper, 1988) subjective emotional experience. Most 
recently, the important role that visceral information plays in 
emotion and the ways this information is organized in the 
brain have become active areas of inquiry in neuroscience 
research using both patient and activation models (e.g., Craig, 
2009; Critchley, 2005). Thus, the stage may now be set 
for a new round of systematic examinations of the degree of 
specificity of ANS and other bodily sensations in different 
emotions.
Reintroducing the study of bodily sensations into research on 
ANS specificity provides an opportunity to search for convergence 
across different ways of assessing ANS activity. For example, in 
our studies of ANS specificity using the directed facial action task 
(Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; Levenson et al., 1990), one of 
the reliable differences between emotions was higher levels of fin-
ger temperature associated with anger compared to fear. A very 
similar ANS difference has also been reported in studies of the 
temperature-related metaphors people use to describe their emo-
tions (Lakoff, 1987) and in cross-national studies of self-reported 
physical sensations associated with different emotions (Scherer & 
Wallbott, 1994; Wallbott & Scherer, 1988).
A cautionary note regarding ANS specificity in the fMRI 
era. ANS data are increasingly being collected as part of 
fMRI studies of the brain activation that occurs during emotion. 
It is not difficult to envision a new generation of data relevant 
to ANS specificity in emotion that comes from these kinds of 
studies. Because movement artifacts are very troublesome in 
fMRI studies, many scanner paradigms use extremely weak 
emotion elicitors, often more related to emotion recognition 
than emotion generation. If the ANS data obtained from these 
studies are to be helpful in addressing fundamental issues con-
cerning ANS patterning in emotion (both coherence and speci-
ficity), it is critical that these data be held to the same standards 
of verification, intensity, comprehensiveness, and timing that 
are being proposed here for studies that take place outside of 
the magnet.
Empirical support. Debate on ANS specificity in emotion 
has a rich intellectual history, tracing back to the diametrically 
opposing views of James (1884), who argued for ANS specific-
ity, and Cannon (1927), who argued against. In the ensuing dec-
ades a large number of empirical studies have been conducted 
addressing this issue (134 in the most recent comprehensive 
review; Kreibig, 2010). Despite this sizeable body of work, the 
controversy endures, with different authors coming to dramati-
cally different conclusions as to the degree of ANS specificity 
that exists in emotion (e.g., Barrett, 2006; Cacioppo, Klein, 
Berntson, & Hatfield, 1993; Kreibig, 2010; Levenson, 1992, 
2011; Mauss & Robinson, 2009; Zajonc & McIntosh, 1992).
Although it is probably fair to say that far more published 
studies have reported evidence of ANS differentiation between 
emotions than have not, significant questions can be raised 
about the reliability of these findings across laboratories, ANS 
measures, methods of elicitation (Stemmler, 1989), particular 
emotions (Kreibig, 2010), particular models of emotion (e.g., 
discrete emotions or emotion dimensions; Mauss & Robinson, 
2009), and emotion intensities.
I have speculated that ultimately there will be compelling 
evidence for ANS specificity among four to six of the more 
“basic” emotions (Levenson, 2011). Having said this, I can fully 
understand the conclusion of those who see the existing litera-
ture as being far from definitive. As I have tried to indicate in 
the foregoing sections, there are enormous obstacles that need 
to be overcome if a body of research is going to be created that 
adequately tests the hypothesis of ANS specificity in emotion. 
As long as the bulk of existing research (both that hypothesizing 
specificity and that predicting the opposite) is plagued by prob-
lems related to unverified emotion elicitation, low emotional 
intensity, narrow assessment of ANS functioning, incomplete 
characterization of the activity of autonomic systems, and poor 
temporal matching of ANS measurement to emotion occur-
rence, it will be impossible to reach well-founded, data-based 
conclusions about the extent of ANS specificity in emotion.
ANS Patterning in Emotion: Concluding 
Thoughts
ANS patterning in emotion remains an area of great scientific 
interest. It has profound implications for understanding the 
nature of emotion and for testing predictions derived from dif-
ferent theories of emotion. In addition, high-quality studies of 
ANS patterning, both those that examine coherence and those 
that examine specificity, hold promise for revealing important 
downstream consequences of emotion. These include the influ-
ences of emotion on other psychological processes (e.g., atten-
tion, cognition, learning, memory) and the role that emotion 
plays in mental health, physical health, and well-being.
The dramatic advances in methodologies for measuring 
brain structure and function that have occurred in recent years 
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(e.g., structural and functional MRI, magneto-encephalography, 
multichannel electroencephalography) might have eclipsed inter-
est in the role the ANS plays in emotion. Ironically, the opposite 
has occurred, and there are now rich new theories and under-
standing of how the brain and ANS interact in generating, regulat-
ing, recognizing, and responding to emotion. Along the way, 
there have also been significant advances in the ways that ANS 
activity can be detected and quantified. New hardware and soft-
ware makes it possible to measure an expanding array of ANS 
functions in increasingly detailed and temporally fine-grained 
ways. Applying these methods to the study of ANS coherence and 
specificity in emotion would go a long way toward addressing 
some of the shortcomings of the existing research in terms of the 
issues such as the comprehensiveness of ANS measurement and 
its temporal matching with the occurrence of emotion. Much of 
the remaining needed improvement will be much more low-tech, 
focusing on the quality of paradigms used for eliciting and verify-
ing emotional states and finding ways to produce emotional states 
that are of sufficient intensity, so that the associated emotional 
ANS activity can emerge as detectable signal amidst the vast sea 
of nonemotional ANS activity.
As debate over the extent of ANS patterning in emotion enters 
its second century, there is reason for renewed optimism about 
the potential for new progress in examining fundamental ques-
tions about the extent of ANS patterning in emotion. If we can 
build a body of sound research that consists of carefully designed, 
well-executed studies, we will be in a much better position to 
reach more definitive conclusions about the extent of ANS 
coherence and specificity in emotion. As with any good science, 
the goal of such work should not be to find ways to support a 
particular preconceived position (or discredit another position) at 
any cost, but rather to provide a body of evidence adequate for 
determining the conditions under which ANS coherence and 
specificity exist or for disconfirming these views.
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